A power market with non-convexities may not have an equilibrium price for power that provides economic stability of the centralized dispatch outcome. In this case, the market players are entitled to receive the uplift payments that compensate the economic profit lost when following the centralized dispatch. We consider a special class of the (possibly non-linear) redundant constraints that are redundant not only on the feasible set of the centralized dispatch optimization problem (and, therefore, do not change the centralized dispatch outcome) but also on the larger set obtained when the power balance constraint is relaxed. We show that the Lagrangian relaxation of these redundant constraints may reduce the uplift payments without changing the duality gap. For any given market price (or a pricing algorithm that sets the producer revenue as a function of its output volume) in a uninode multi-period power market with fixed load, we explicitly construct a family of the redundant constraints that do not change the maximum profit of the producer and result in zero uplift payment. We show that the introduction and subsequent Lagrangian relaxation of just one redundant constraint in the centralized dispatch problem suffice to eliminate the uplift payments for all the producers. In the case of the convex hull pricing method, the introduction of these redundant constraints affects neither the duality gap nor the market price for power. The results can be straightforwardly generalized to a power market with the price-sensitive load.
2 some units and the method is similar to pay-as-bid pricing. If only the positive prices are applied to allow generators to retain their profits, then the competitive equilibrium is not achieved. In [7] , [8] this method was further improved to generate more stable prices by adding extra constraints to the reformulated optimization problem that also set certain continuous variables to their optimal values. The nonlinear (discriminatory) pricing methods for power with market player specific prices were developed in [9] [10] [11] [12] . The nonlinear pricing in the form of the generalized uplift functions that includes generators as well as consumers in the lost profit compensation and ensures zero net uplift at the market was proposed in [13] [14] [15] . The minimum zero-sum uplift pricing approach that increases the price above marginal cost and transfers all the additional payments (that the profitable suppliers receive as a result of the price increase) to the unprofitable suppliers to make them whole in the form of internal zero-sum uplifts was introduced in [16] . In [17] a primal-dual approach was proposed to find the market prices that minimize the social welfare reduction due to schedules inconsistency and ensure non-negative generator profits. However, in this approach, some of the lost profit may not be compensated to generators and the competitive equilibrium at the centralized dispatch solution is not achieved. In [18] a semiLagrangian relaxation approach was developed to find a uniform market price that produces the same solution as the original centralized dispatch problem while ensuring the non-confiscatory pricing for generators. A zero-sum uplift pricing scheme that minimizes the maximum contribution to the uplift financing in a market with price-sensitive load was suggested in [19] . In the case of no price-sensitive load, this approach produces the market price equal the maximum average cost of the generators. The minimum-uplift pricing (also known as the convex hull pricing) was proposed in [20] [21] [22] and yields a uniform market price that minimizes the total uplift payment needed to ensure the economic stability of the centralized dispatch outcome. In this approach, at a given market price each market player is compensated the lost profit calculated as the difference between the maximum value of its profit function on the market player private feasible set and its profit received when following the centralized dispatch. Since the uplift payments distort the uniform market pricing and decrease the transparency of the market pricing method, it is critical to reduce these payments. In [23] , [24] it was proposed to modify the minimum-uplift pricing method by excluding the power volumes that are not attainable in a decentralized market from the lost profit calculation since the opportunities to supply these volumes are not forgone by a market player when accepting the centralized dispatch outcome. This approach results in the lower (or equal) total uplift payment compared to the minimum-uplift pricing algorithm.
For the convex hull pricing method, in [25] it was suggested to reduce the total uplift payment, which compensates the lost profit of the market players, at the expense of having one affine redundant constraint introduced in the centralized dispatch optimization problem. This new constraint depends on the unit status variables of all generators and leads to the introduction of the new service (a unit being online) and the associated price in addition to the market price for power, which can be viewed as the producer revenue function amendments. The linearity of the redundant constraint ensures that the duality gap, introduced by the Lagrangian relaxation of both the power balance constraint and the new constraint, is equal to that in the absence of the redundant constraint [26] . However, introduction and subsequent dualization of the new constraint entails that the duality gap may no longer coincide with the total uplift, which is potentially reduced but generally still non-zero.
In this paper, we study the problem of the total uplift (lost profit) reduction in a general pricing setting, which fixes the producer (consumer) revenue (cost) as a function of its status-output (consumption) variables, by introduction of the redundant constraints and the corresponding non-negative amendments to the revenue (cost) functions. Thus, our study is also applicable to the cases with uniform pricing for power (such as marginal pricing, convex hull pricing) and discriminatory (non-linear) pricing with the uplift payments. For simplicity, we consider a multi-period uninode power market with the fixed load. The analysis and the results can be easily translated to markets with price-sensitive demand. To simplify the notations, we assume that each producer operates just one generating unit.
We consider a special type of the redundant constraints -the constraints that hold not only on the feasible set of the centralized dispatch optimization problem but also on the larger set obtained by relaxing the power balance constraint. The redundant constraints under consideration are introduced in the market player individual profit optimization problems. Therefore, we require that each constraint depends on just one producer status-output variable. We show that it suffices to consider only this class of the redundant constraints to fully absorb the uplift payment of a producer (thus, resulting in zero uplift payment) and find the general form expression for the corresponding revenue amendment function for the producer. This function satisfies the following three properties: it is non-negative on the producer private feasible set, makes no contribution to the producer maximum profit, and yields zero uplift payment for the producer. For the uniform market price, we show that just one redundant constraint, which is the sum (over all the producers) of these properly rescaled redundant constraints) introduced directly in the centralized dispatch optimization problem suffices to produce zero total uplift. If the uniform market price for power is set by the convex hull pricing method, the dualization of both the power balance constraint and the new (redundant) constraint results in the same set of the market prices and the same maximum profit for each producer but gives zero total uplift.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the conditions on the revenue amendment function that is non-negative on the producer private feasible set, leaves the producer maximum profit unaffected, and fully absorbs the uplift payment. In Section 3 we introduce the redundant constraints and study their relations with the revenue amendment functions and the uplift reduction problem. In Section 4 we formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for a given set of the redundant constraints and the associated multipliers to produce zero uplift. The general form expression for the revenue amendment function that satisfies the three abovementioned properties is obtained in Section 5. In Section 6 we apply the proposal to power markets with marginal pricing, while the application of the method to a producer with linear cost function is given in Section 7. In Section 8 we construct the revenue amendment functions and the corresponding redundant constraints in a numerical example. The results are summarized in Section 9. Some mathematical aspects of the redundant constraints are summarized in the Appendix.
II. The problem formulation
Consider T -period uninode power market with the fixed load d , 
. Let i X be the producer i private feasible set (which is assumed to be nonempty and compact) and ) ( i i C x be the offer cost function of the producer i . The centralized dispatch problem has the form
The feasible set of (1) is assumed to be nonempty and compact. Let ) ,..,
denote an optimal point of (1). Although we consider a centrally coordinated power market with a fixed load, it is straightforward to include the price-sensitive demand in our analyses. For a given price p , can be viewed as the cost of the commitment ticket payable to the generator i for following the centralized dispatch [20] [21] [22] . If the price-sensitive demand is present in the system, then such a compensation mechanism should be applied to the demand side as well. (We note that for some ) , (
, if the total uplift payment is non-zero and all the consumers submit only the price-sensitive bids, then this leads to the budget-balancing problem as the total uplift payment (if non-zero) exceeds the amount that can be collected from the market players provided that no consumer (producer) can be charged (paid) above (below) its bid cost. In the present paper, we do not address this problem.) The uplift payment in the amount of should not change the maximum generator profit in the decentralized dispatch problem:
Second, we impose zero uplift condition:
(3) We also require that the new term in the generator revenue function is a rewarding, not penalizing, addition to the standard revenue function ) , (
We observe that if the uplift payment is not needed (i.e. ) ( ) (
, as the profit function may still be amended with no effect on its maximum value and its value at
However, this condition can be easily satisfied since given any
Therefore, in what follows, we focus on (2) -(4). Since the total profit (including the uplift payment) received by each generator still equals
. Thus, the introduction of
does not address the abovementioned issue of revenue adequacy problem relevant for systems with no fixed load. Also, (2) and (4) 
which gives
, where p is treated as the fixed external parameter. Moreover, there is a strong duality between (9) and its dual obtained from the Lagrangian relaxation of the power balance constraint with p being an optimal value of the dual variable. Proof. Consider the Lagrangian function
value of the dual function at p q  , which is feasible in the dual problem, equals the value of the primal problem objective function at * x x  , which is feasible in the primal problem (9) . Consequently, we have a strong duality, and ) ( * p x , is an optimal primal-dual pair. Proposition is proved.
If conditions of Proposition 1 hold, then p is a uniform equilibrium price for each generator. Proposition 1 can be straightforwardly generalized to a power market with the price-sensitive consumer bids. In this case, the existence of an equilibrium price does not eliminate the abovementioned budget-balancing problem since (due to the amendments of the consumer cost functions/producer revenue functions) the sum of the consumer payments is at most d 
III.
Utilizing the redundant constraints for the uplift payment reduction Let us consider some real-valued functions
, where we adopt a convention that a vector is non-negative (nonpositive) if all of its components are non-negative (non-positive). Clearly, with regard to the centralized dispatch problem (1), the constraints
The problem that is dual to (10) reads:
There is a strong duality between (10) and (11):
Proof.
, we obtain
, with a market price p obtained using the convex hull pricing method, the same reasoning used to prove Proposition 2 can be applied to the dual problem obtained from (1) can be added to the constraint set of (1) with some fixed value of p , which is treated as constant in both the primal (1) and the dual problems. Second, the set of constraints (together with the power balance constraint) do not affect the duality gap between (1) and its dual.
In [26] it has been shown that dualization of the affine redundant constraints together with the set of the original constraints of a primal problem results in the 8 same value of the duality gap that emerges from dualization of the original constraints of the primal problem (in our case, this is the power balance constraint), while introduction and dualization of the non-affine redundant constraints may change the value of the dual problem and, hence, affect the duality gap. Although the redundant constraints studied in the present paper are generally non-affine, they do not change the duality gap. The reason is that we deal with a special type of redundant constraints: these constraints hold on
, not just on  , and Proposition 2 implies that these (possible non-affine) redundant constraints also do not change the duality gap. Thus, the dualization of the redundant constraints, which belong to the specified type, do not affect the value of the dual problem and the duality gap.
Let us define a set ) ( min arg ) (
. Clearly, the set and the price p . Since
, and (2) and (4) 
. From (12) we also have a condition on 
, then such a constraint makes no contribution to the producer i uplift payment since it does not affect the producer profit.
Clearly, (4) is equivalent to
The set of equations (2) and (3) can be transformed to have the form of the optimization problem. Define the producer i uplift payment as
Consider the optimization problem
Using the definition of (14) is expressed as:
. (15) The immediate consequence of (15) is that if
denotes the boundary of
. Thus, the minimum uplift problem for the given price p and constraint vector function
, is reduced to the problem of finding a point on the boundary of
such that the hyperplane containing this point and having the normal vector ) , (
, or, equivalently, finding an element of the nonempty closed convex set
with the largest projection into the direction specified by the vector ) , (
. We note that for a case of one function ) , (
, the optimal point of (15) is unique and given by the maximum element of
to the revenue function results in the lower (or equal) uplift. Clearly, the magnitude of the uplift reduction due to the introduction of ) , (
in the producer revenue function essentially depends on the choice of ) , (
, which subsequently specifies the set
. For example, only the redundant constraints that satisfy 0 ) ,
may reduce the uplift. The necessary condition for a given vector function
to yield zero uplift payment for the producer i is formulated in the Appendix.
Since
, which satisfies the conditions (2) -(3), and solutions to (14) with some
Proof. Let the conditions (2) and (3) 
. Likewise,
. Proposition is proved.
IV.
Attaining zero uplift payment Now we formulate different forms of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a given vector function
, and a multiplier 0  i  to produce zero uplift for generator i , i.e. for the corresponding ) , ( ) , (
to satisfy the conditions (2) and (3). We note that (4) automatically holds for
for with some real-valued vector function
Proof. Obviously, for a given (3) and (4) are equivalent to (17) and (16), respectively. Now we show that (2) holds iff (18) is satisfied, given the validity of (16) and (17) . On one hand, if (2) holds with (18) is clearly satisfied. On the other hand, if (18) 
and (17) 
, and can be excluded from consideration. Second, if (17) and (18) are satisfied by two different pairs 
In this case, the function
with the second term having the form of the uplift payment in the amount of ) ,
which reflects the uplift payment reduction from adding ) , ( . Utilization of (19) , then (17) and (18) 
Proof. First, we show that, given the assumptions of the proposition, (17) and (18) imply (20) 
, we conclude that (18) holds. Due to (20) and (22) 
Proposition is proved. We note that to derive (17) from (20), (22), and (23) we needed validity of (22) and (23) (21) - (23) is equivalent to the set of the following statements: (21) is valid for
, (22) and (23) hold for some
Thus, Propositions 4, 5 give the necessary and sufficient conditions for a given
, and
to yield zero uplift payment for the producer i . We also note that the different formulations of the redundant constraints generally result in the non-equivalent amendments of the generator revenue function. For example, the constraint set 0 ) , ( . This is because the transition from a set of the constraints 0 ) , (
is a nonlinear operation, while the considered amendment functions are linear in the redundant constraints.
Clearly, just one appropriate redundant constraint is sufficient to obtain zero uplift payment for the generator i : for example, ) , ( ) , (
with the associated multiplier equal 1. Likewise, given a vector function ) , ( , the total uplift payment is 
implies
Consequently, the total uplift payment equals
which is zero due to (3) . If the uniform market price p is obtained using the convex hull pricing method,
is the original duality gap, but the total uplift payment no longer equals the duality gap and can be reduced to zero by utilizing the proper functions ) , (
We also note the following relation to the dual problem. 
with some non-negative real-valued function ) , (
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that (24) satisfies (2) - (4). Now we show that (2) - (4) entail (24) with some function ) , (
satisfies (3) and (4), we have 0
, we obtain (24) . Proposition is proved.
From (24) 
Example 3 Setting
. In this case, the profit function becomes a constant independent of i x and the producer is indifferent to its output volume. (If unacceptable, such a solution can be easily excluded by adding a condition that
Let us utilize the freedom to choose an arbitrary (non-negative on 
denotes the concave hull of a function on the set 
VI.
Application to power markets with marginal pricing In the case of a power market with marginal pricing, p is identified as the marginal price faced by the generator i (the system marginal price or the locational marginal price at the generator node), and 
16
As it was mentioned above, the choice for ) ,
satisfying (2) - (4) . Consider the redundant constraint that results from the product of these constraints for all the time instances: satisfy (16) - (18). Thus, the conditions (2) - (4) hold for
is non-negative, has the right value at * i i x x  and has no effect on the maximum value of the profit function: with
These functions have the following properties,
which implies that ) ( 
It is straightforward to check that the expression (32) for ) , (
can be expressed in terms of (24) with
We note that for the given market price p and statuses of the unit, the new terms in the profit function are constant. In the case of one-period market model with no intertemporal constraints (ramp, minimum up/down time constraints, etc.), we have

, which entails 
